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EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO CAUSES OF ACTION




If any line of decisions by the Rehnquist Court has sparked the
most ardent disagreement by legal academics, it has been the sover-
eign immunity decisions.  Beginning with Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida 1 in 1996, the Court has invalidated congressional efforts to
hold states liable for private suits seeking monetary damages for vio-
lations of federal law not based on the Reconstruction Amend-
ments.  Scholars have heavily criticized these decisions as unfaithful
to the Constitution, as undermining legitimate national goals with-
out any corresponding benefit, and as creating a doctrinal mess
without theoretical coherence.2  These scholars’ criticisms follow
the lead of the four dissenting Justices on the Supreme Court who
have consistently presented four opposing votes to every Eleventh
Amendment holding.
We believe that these criticisms are vastly exaggerated.  While
the decisions serve as strong symbols of the importance of federal-
ism to the Rehnquist Court, the rulings establish no serious barrier
* Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law (Boalt Hall).
** Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.  We thank Peter Brachman for
excellent research assistance, and the Boalt Hall Fund for financial support.
1. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201,
1202 (2001) (“Sovereign immunity is inconsistent with a central maxim of American
government: no one, not even the government, is above the law.”); Vicki C. Jackson,
Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (“The Court has for the last
ten years chosen to expand the range of government immunity from suit for wrongdo-
ing, a result compelled neither by history nor logic.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign
Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2000)
(“In ways that the Court fails to acknowledge, its effort fails to promote any coherent
conception of states’ rights or state autonomy while harming legitimate national
objectives.”).
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to a Congress and President intent on achieving national policy
objectives.  The Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases have the effect
of eliminating private suits for retrospective damages as an instru-
ment of federal policy.  But Congress still retains a broad arsenal of
powers to achieve its ends, and even without new federal legislation,
can hold states liable for damages as long as suit is brought by the
United States.  To be sure, the prohibition against recovering mon-
etary damages against states may leave individual plaintiffs less than
fully compensated when harmed by state violations of federal statu-
tory law.  This prohibition may also lead to some under-enforce-
ment of constitutional norms.  Nonetheless, the important question
is whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents the federal govern-
ment from achieving its policy aims.  We conclude that the Consti-
tution still provides Congress a broad arsenal of powers to achieve
its ends.  With these tools, Congress can act to ensure that states
and individuals comply with the Constitution and federal law.  Most
academics have singularly focused on damages lawsuits as the pri-
mary means for the enforcement of federal law, and have under-
stated the much broader and effective powers available to the
national political branches.
Part II of this Essay discusses briefly the Eleventh Amendment
cases and the academic commentary they have generated.  Part III
explains what we describe as the “internal” constraints on state sov-
ereign immunity — those created by the Court’s Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrine itself — such as the availability of prospective relief,
suits against state officers in their private capacities, and suits
brought by the United States.  Part IV discusses what we describe as
“external” limitations on sovereign immunity — those supplied by
sources outside of the Eleventh Amendment doctrine — such as
the Spending Clause and Congress’s foreign affairs powers.  Finally,
we conclude that the limitations outlined in Parts III and IV are
sufficient to ensure that the sovereign immunity doctrine will not
become an insuperable barrier to the federal government achieving
its national policy objectives.
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II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DEBATE
The text of the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,3 states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.4
The origins of the Eleventh Amendment are a familiar story, and
we do not repeat it here.5  Academic debate has focused on
whether the Amendment’s text only prohibits diversity suits be-
tween a state and the citizens of a different state,6 or whether it
gives effect to a broader principle of state sovereign immunity.
We do not seek to pass judgment on which side of the debate
has things right, or what method of interpretation ought to be used
to grasp the Amendment’s meaning.7  Rather, we begin with the
Rehnquist Court’s reinvigoration of sovereign immunity in Seminole
Tribe.  Overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,8 which had been
decided only six years earlier, the five Justice majority held that
Congress could not allow private parties to seek monetary damages
3. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. For the standard historical discussions, see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96–102 (rev. ed. 1932); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801,
at 734–41 (1971).
6. See, e.g., John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1894, 2004 (1983) (arguing for a strict con-
struction of the Eleventh Amendment, stating that the Amendment’s text only prohib-
its diversity suits); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohi-
bition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045–54 (1983) (stating that the Elev-
enth Amendment was “designed merely to require a limiting construction of the state-
citizen diversity clause”).
7. For recent efforts, see John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Precise
Reading of Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1733–49 (2004) (arguing that the
Eleventh Amendment’s “specificity cannon” has a crucial role in applying the Eleventh
Amendment); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1653 (2002) (arguing that the Court failed to distinguish between
personal and subject matter jurisdiction in interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
8. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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from states for violations of federal laws enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.9  In response to the dissenters’ arguments that
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply in federal question cases,
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Framers understood Ar-
ticle III not to grant subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts
over such cases:
The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented
by the decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact that the
federal courts did not have federal-question jurisdiction
at the time the Amendment was passed (and would not
have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought
was given to the prospect of federal-question jurisdiction
over the States.10
The Eleventh Amendment, in other words, only restored the status
quo ante that had existed before Chisholm, and state sovereign im-
munity was inherent in the constitutional structure in 1789.
The Rehnquist Court then expanded Seminole Tribe in various
ways.  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. Col-
lege Savings Bank, the Court narrowly interpreted Congress’s reme-
dial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment —
which trumps the limits of the Eleventh Amendment11 — to protect
states against private damage suits.12  Specifically, the Court held
that the Reconstruction Amendments do not authorize Congress to
create a private damages remedy against states that violate a patent,
unless Congress can show a broad pattern of state patent infringe-
ment.13  Soon after Florida Prepaid, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court
invalidated portions of the Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act that provided damages remedies
9. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69–70.
10. Id. 
11. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 671 (1999) (“Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity only when it legis-
lates to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976) (stating that sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is limited by
the enforcement provision of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639–48 (1999).
13. Id. at 640.
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for injured persons, again reasoning that there was insufficient evi-
dence showing a history or pattern of state violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment.14
Academic response to these cases has generally been negative
and widespread.  Daniel Meltzer criticizes Eleventh Amendment
doctrine for lack of any real constitutional theory and argues that
sovereign immunity cannot meet any cost-benefit test for govern-
ment policy.  State sovereign immunity, in his words, “fails to pro-
mote any coherent conception of states’ rights or state autonomy
while harming legitimate national objectives.”15  Erwin Chemerin-
sky argues that the Eleventh Amendment cases have placed the Su-
preme Court above the Constitution.  He contends that “sovereign
immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should
be eliminated from American law” because it allows a judicially-cre-
ated common law doctrine to “reign supreme over the Constitution
and federal law.”16  Vicki Jackson declares that “the Court’s Elev-
enth Amendment and sovereign immunity case law deserves the
condemnation and resistance of scholars.”17  In her view, sovereign
immunity is itself unconstitutional and serves only to promote “gov-
ernment nonaccountability” and to place “the fiscal interests of the
states over the supremacy of federal law.”18  Even Ernest Young,
generally a supporter of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism deci-
sions, acknowledges that the Eleventh Amendment cases do not
seem successful at a functional level.  He concludes that sovereign
immunity “is a poor way to protect state prerogatives in a federal
system.”19
14. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).  In two more recent cases, however, Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Court
upheld statutory regimes that overrode state sovereign immunity — the former in the
context of sex-based discrimination, the latter involving the right of access to courts —
because they either contained sufficient evidence of state discrimination or remedied
the violation of a fundamental right.
15. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1011–12.
16. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201, 1211.
17. Jackson, supra note 2, at 953.
18. Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Dena-
tionalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 691 (2000).
19. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 S. CT.
REV. 1, 2.
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On the other hand, academic supporters of the Court’s posi-
tion find that the cases achieve no real change in the structure of
remedies for constitutional violations.  John Jeffries, for example,
argues that the damages actions against state officers for violations
of federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983) provide the
right framework for constitutional remedies.20  Henry Monaghan
finds that the prospective damages actions provided by Ex Parte
Young mean that “little has changed” due to the recent Eleventh
Amendment cases.21
III. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
We do not believe that the Eleventh Amendment cases have
made no mark, but like Jeffries and Monaghan, we also think that
the primary focus should be on whether the federal government
retains sufficient powers to achieve national policy objectives.  The
Court has identified a number of exceptions internal to Eleventh
Amendment doctrine that still allow federal courts to enforce fed-
eral law against states.
First, as the Court has recognized throughout its Eleventh
Amendment cases, plaintiffs can seek an injunction for prospective
relief against individual state officers for violations of federal law.
Ex Parte Young held that such suits did not violate the Eleventh
Amendment because a state officer is “stripped of his official or rep-
resentative character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quence of his individual conduct” when he violates federal law.22
While the plaintiff in an Ex Parte Young proceeding may not receive
full compensation for individual harms, lawsuits for injunctive relief
provide a powerful means for guaranteeing state compliance with
federal constitutional and statutory norms — including payment of
state funds for the damages flowing from the violation of a prospec-
tive injunction.23
20. John C. Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47, 49–50 (1998).
21. Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102,
103 (1996).
22. 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) (holding that a cause of action can be brought
against a state by an individual on grounds that the suit asserts liability against a state
officer for federal law violations rather than against the state per se).
23. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1017.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-3\NLR302.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-MAY-06 16:57
2005-2006] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 721
Second, the Supreme Court permits suits for retrospective
damages against state officers in their private capacities, so long as
there is less than a virtual certainty that damages will be paid from
the state treasury.24  While there are complicated issues regarding
indemnification and the liability of state treasuries,25 in many in-
stances plaintiffs can recover money damages from individual rep-
resentatives of the state.26
Third, as Professor Jeffries has emphasized, section 1983 pro-
vides a damages remedy against state officials for a broad class of
state violations of constitutional rights.  Section 1983 holds state of-
ficials liable for violations of either the Constitution or other fed-
eral law, subject to certain important immunities.  Judges and
legislators enjoy absolute immunity, while executive branch officials
receive a qualified immunity if they believed in good faith that their
actions were consistent with federal law.  Professor Jeffries endorses
this negligence standard because it only provides compensation for
unreasonable actions, and thus provides the best level of deterrence
for future actions.  While section 1983 does not provide compre-
hensive compensation for actions which ex ante appear legal but ex
post violate federal law, these immunity doctrines are creations of
federal common law that Congress can choose to override.  If sec-
tion 1983 provides only incomplete compensation, that is a decision
by Congress not to duplicate the full scope of judicially enforceable
damages remedies available in suits against non-state defendants for
violations of federal law.
24. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (finding that retrospective
damages against state officers in their personal capacities are only disallowed if there is
a “virtual certainty” that the damages will be paid from the state treasury and “not from
the pockets of individual state officials”).
25. See Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 464 (2002) (exploring the Rehnquist Court’s connec-
tions between judicial conservatism and a commitment to federalism as they relate to
the interplay between federal law and liability shielding for state and local governments
and their subdivisions); Jeffries, supra note 20, at 50–51 (examining the interplay be-
tween the Eleventh Amendment and section 1983, and highlighting that the Eleventh
Amendment is frequently not a bar to actions by individuals against states because most
of these actions can be asserted under the broad mandate of section 1983).
26. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 859, 880 (2000) (“[I]n reality, damage judgments rendered against individual
state officers are usually paid by the state.”).
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Fourth, as the Court recognized in Alden v. Maine, sovereign
immunity poses no bar to suits for damages against states brought
by the United States.27  Lawsuits commenced by the federal govern-
ment, according to the Court, “require the exercise of political re-
sponsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which
is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue noncon-
senting States.”28  While the United States may automatically sue
when its proprietary interests are involved, it can also bring a dam-
ages action if authorized to do so by Congress, and it may distribute
the recovery to injured parties.29  A number of such provisions exist
in different regulatory schemes, but if Congress concludes that fed-
eral rights are being under-enforced, it can simply authorize the
executive branch to bring damages actions in all instances of viola-
tions of federal law.  To the extent that the Executive Branch does
not have sufficient resources to carry out such a task, that again is a
choice of the national political branches.  Congress can appropriate
funds to create more Justice Department litigators charged with en-
forcing federal regulatory statutes, or it can create double or even
treble damages to cover increased litigation costs, thereby increas-
ing deterrence.30  We recognize that reliance on suits brought by
the United States centralizes enforcement of federal law in the Ex-
ecutive at the expense of private parties, but we suggest that this
also makes the enforcement of federal law more accountable and
transparent both to Congress and to the electorate at large.
Fifth, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5)
continues to provide Congress with the ability to hold states respon-
sible for violations of constitutional rights through damages actions.
City of Boerne v. Flores established a barrier to Congress’s enforce-
ment powers by requiring that prophylactic statutory remedies for
constitutional violations be congruent and proportional to a pat-
tern or history of state violations of judicially recognized federal
27. 527 U.S. 706, 755–56 (1999).
28. Id. at 756.
29. Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 553 U.S. 1, 9 (2001) (finding that, in a suit between
states, “it is the State’s prerogative either to deposit the proceeds of any judgment in
‘the general coffers of the State’ or to use them to ‘benefit those who were hurt’”).
30. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intel-
lectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1371–72 (2001); see also William P. Marshall, Un-
derstanding Alden, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 816–17 (2000).
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rights.31  Nonetheless, in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, the ma-
jority held that congressional efforts to enforce against the states a
federal right — through damages actions — against gender dis-
crimination overrode state sovereign immunity because sex discrim-
ination by the state was subject to heightened scrutiny.32  Similarly,
Tennessee v. Lane upheld damages remedies against a state when the
state had deprived the plaintiff of his right of access to the courts —
a fundamental right judicially recognized as emanating from the
Due Process Clause.33  These cases demonstrate that City of Boerne
has not limited the Section 5 power to cases of remedying race dis-
crimination, as some had feared, but instead that Congress still re-
tains significant ability to enact damages remedies for violations of
established constitutional rights.34
IV. EXTERNAL LIMITS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Part III reviewed the variety of methods that Congress may still
use to compel states to obey federal policies, either through suits
for damages or through other judicial action, without colliding with
the Court’s Eleventh Amendment case law.  This Part discusses pow-
ers “external” to the Eleventh Amendment, in that they are
independent of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions on state sovereign
immunity.
First, Congress retains significant authority under the Spend-
ing Clause to evade state sovereign immunity.  Congress may simply
attach compliance with a national policy standard as a condition to
the receipt of federal funds.  Congress, for example, effectively en-
acted a national drinking age of twenty-one by explicitly requiring
31. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
32. 538 U.S. at 728.
33. 541 U.S. at 529.
34. In addition, Fourteenth Amendment remedies are available in the property
and due process areas that may not be subject to the City of Boerne limitations on the
Section 5 power.  Under the Takings Clause, for example, states must provide just com-
pensation for seizures of private property; this damages remedy is required by the Con-
stitution itself. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 316 (1987).  In addition, the Court has suggested in cases where property has
been taken or a right infringed without meeting the standards of procedural due pro-
cess, the Due Process Clause may directly require a remedy. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins,
513 U.S. 106, 110–12 (1994); Eric Rakowski, Harper and its Aftermath, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
445, 472 (1993).
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all states that received federal highway funds to match the federal
standard.  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld this use of spending conditions to
achieve federal policy, even though the Twenty-First Amendment
prohibits Congress from directly enacting legislation establishing a
national drinking age.35  If Dole remains good law, and it appears to
be, then Congress could simply require states that receive federal
funds to waive their sovereign immunity in any lawsuit brought to
enforce a constitutional or federal statutory right.  In Florida Pre-
paid, for example, Congress could have simply provided that any
state receiving federal research funding must subject itself to law-
suits for damages arising from the infringement of a federal pat-
ent.36  Or Congress could attach as a condition to federal funding
that states offer their own remedial process for violations of federal
rights.37
Congress could also use its spending powers more directly by
simply reducing or even completely eliminating federal expendi-
tures for states that fail to respect federal policies.  If a state refuses
to obey federal patents, for example, Congress could respond in
the next appropriations cycle by reducing grants to the state’s uni-
versities.  While cutting funding might have the effect of harming
the groups that Congress seeks to protect, it would also put tremen-
dous pressure on state officials to change the policies that have vio-
lated federal law.
Second, Congress could seek to use its foreign affairs power to
override state sovereign immunity.  In Missouri v. Holland, the Court
indicated that federalism limitations on Congress’s enumerated
powers in Article I, section 8, such as the Commerce Clause, do not
apply to the exercise of the treaty power.38 Holland upheld a fed-
eral statute enacted to implement a treaty with Canada which pro-
tected migratory birds, although it had previously held that an
earlier version of the statute enacted solely pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause had violated the Constitution.  While the Court has
not revisited the Holland issue, scholars have argued that Congress
35. 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
36. See Meltzer, supra note 30, at 1380.
37. See Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: Federal-
ism and Individual Rights, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 460, 464–65 (1995).
38. 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920).
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may make treaties on almost any subject,39 and that these interna-
tional agreements remain outside the limitations of the powers re-
served to the states recognized in the Tenth Amendment.40
Recent cases have found that the federal government possesses
an unenumerated foreign affairs power, one that may be exercised
even in the absence of any formal statute, treaty, or executive agree-
ment.41  Presumably, Congress could exercise this power to force
states to waive their sovereign immunity, even though such a tactic
could not be employed were an area of purely domestic law at issue.
Third, several non-federal alternatives exist that can provide
monetary remedies for violations of federal law.  States may have
regulatory schemes designed to provide remedies for violations of
39. A number of works have appeared debating whether Holland continues to
make sense after the expansion of the Commerce Clause during the New Deal. See
Carlos Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 741 (2002)
(arguing that Holland continues to be good law); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100–01 (2000) (stating that Holland
must be limited or overruled); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federal-
ism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 450–51 (1998) (“My argument is that the federal government
should not be able to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law that could not be
created by Congress. To the extent that this conclusion would require overruling Hol-
land, I argue that the justifications for stare decisis are weak . . . .”); David M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (providing a thoughtful review of Holland
and its legitimacy).  For our purposes, we only wish to explore the possibilities in regard
to state sovereign immunity if the current doctrine remains good law.  If treaties were
originally not subject to the limitations of the Tenth Amendment, then Congress theo-
retically could enact legislation that overrides state sovereign immunity to implement a
treaty.  Peter Menell, for example, has argued that Congress could require states to pay
monetary damages for violating federal patents, essentially evading Florida Prepaid, in
order to enforce international agreements on intellectual property.  Peter S. Menell,
Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1460–64 (2000).
40. United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 85 (2d. Cir. 1997) (citing LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 191 (1996)) (stating that the
Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that treaties cannot deal with matters reserved
to the states through constitutional scheme and Tenth Amendment); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 302–303 (1987)
(“[The] Tenth Amendment . . . does not limit the power to make treaties or other
agreements.”).
41. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–87 (2000) (“Be-
cause the state Act’s provisions conflict with Congress’s specific delegation to the Presi-
dent of flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of actions and
actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy under the
federal Act, it is preempted . . . .”).
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federal law by state officers.  While Alden v. Maine made clear that
states enjoyed sovereign immunity in their own judicial systems, the
Court also pointed out that states may waive the privilege in either
federal or state court.42 Kimel and Garrett observed that even
though states cannot be sued under federal employment laws, every
state has its own employment discrimination and minimum wage
and hour laws.43  Similarly, every state provides remedies for age
and disability discrimination.44  In the area of intellectual property,
plaintiffs who have suffered patent infringements at the hands of a
state may be able to sue for inverse condemnation under the state’s
takings clause.45
State common law may also provide additional sources of re-
lief.  Plaintiffs whose federal statutory rights are violated could sue
under a tort action, such as conversion or misappropriation.46
Most states have their own tort claims acts in which they have
waived sovereign immunity.47  Additionally, if a state has violated a
plaintiff’s federal rights in a contract context, state contract law may
provide a means of recovery.  Most states have waived sovereign im-
munity when they enter into contracts.48
To be sure, these alternatives are imperfect.  They may have
different elements than a federal remedy would provide, they might
not afford the same level of compensation, or they may possess dif-
ferent procedural barriers.  These state alternatives also might run
42. 527 U.S. at 757–58.
43. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
44. See Brent W. Landau, State Employees and Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and
Strategies for Enforcing Federal Employment Laws, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 189 (2002).
45. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 644 n.9 (1999).
46. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 39, at 1417 (suggesting that intellectual property
holders may sue state infringers under various common law tort doctrines).
47. Id. at 1418.
48. Approximately twenty states have statues waiving sovereign immunity in con-
tract. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (2003) (“[i]mmunity in actions based on a
contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided
by the contract if the contract was within the powers granted to the entity . . . .”).  Many
other states have judicially waived immunity in contract. See, e.g., State Hwy. Dep’t v.
Milton Constr., 586 So. 2d 872, 875 (Ala. 1991).
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into preemption problems if they conflict with a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme.49
Finally, as with Congress’s use of its spending power, political
checks at the state level may also provide means for achieving na-
tional objectives.  State officials who refuse to compensate their own
citizens for violations of federal rights may come under political
pressure to waive sovereign immunity, provide a state remedy, or at
least cease the illegal activity.50  While these measures may not yield
the full measure of compensation that would be available in a dam-
ages action, we suggest that sufficient transparency and accountabil-
ity may well exist in state government such that it would often be
difficult for elected state officials to continue violating federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
The signature issue of the Rehnquist Court has been its re-
newed judicial protection for states’ rights.  Decisions shielding the
states from damages actions not based in legislation enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments have received steady academic criti-
cism.  Our purpose in this Essay has been to demonstrate that schol-
arly concern about the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence is exaggerated.  While state sovereign immunity pre-
vents plaintiffs from recovering retrospective damages from states
that violate federal law, a number of doctrines internal and external
to the Eleventh Amendment provide Congress with substantial
means for enforcing federal law and policies.
It is not obvious why the Rehnquist Court would devote sub-
stantial resources to developing a line of cases that pose no serious
barriers to Congress, while at the same time depriving individuals of
full vindication of their constitutional or statutory rights.  We be-
lieve that one effect of the decisions, conscious or not, is to poten-
tially concentrate greater law enforcement discretion in the hands
of the Executive branch.  If the United States can successfully over-
ride sovereign immunity by itself suing the states, as the Court has
concluded, then the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment
49. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 39, at 1426–27 (noting that federal law preempts
any state statue that undermines or conflicts with the federal patent regime).
50. See Landau, supra note 44, at 207 (noting that at least fourteen states filed
amicus briefs opposing state sovereign immunity in Garrett).
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hinges first on action by Congress, and then on the decisions of the
President and the relevant agencies, rather than the choices of pri-
vate parties.  It remains to be seen whether a new Court will
continue following the same path.
